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During recent years the United States has experienced
a dramatic increase in Government spending. Expanding mili-
tary requirements, new space programs, and increased domestic
programs, as well as other federally sponsored projects too
numerous to mention, have forced the federal budget to a
level approximating $185 billion with budget projections
indicating a possible level of $195 billion by 1971.
To visualize the increase in federal spending it is
only necessary to compare present levels with those of
previous years. The federal budget proposed for fiscal year
1969 contained an increase of $13.1 billion, in actual
3 bu2expenditures, over fiscal year 1968 expenditures. The dget
included approximately $79.8 billion for national defense.
This figure evidences a large increase over the $ ziO-billion
range experienced in 1961 and 1962 for national defense.
"Laying Out the Choices Nixon Faces," Business Week
,
November 50, 1968, p. 126.
o
1969 Collier's Encyclopedia Yearbook (New York:




"Critics Fire at Military Budget," Business Week
,
February 15, 1969, p. 116.
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As the volume of Government expenditures has
increased, the volume of Government procurements has
increased. Increased procurements have resulted in an
increasing need for methods and procedures which provide
controls adequate to ensure integrity in the procurement
system. One method which has developed in this area is
the protest of award, or bid protest.
An unsuccessful bidder for a Government contract may
express his objections to a proposed contract award or to
an award already made if he believes Government procurement
regulations have not been adhered to or have been violated.
The bid protest concept provides a service to both the
unsuccessful bidder and to the Government. Unsuccessful
bidders are provided an avenue to express objections, which
they would not otherwise have. This is necessarily true as
the bidders have not been permitted to contest the awards of
contracts in the courts. Simultaneously, the concept
provides a means by which the Government may locate and
correct errors and abuses in the award of Government
contracts.
Bid protest procedures are not explicitly provided
for by statute; however, relevant procedures have been
developed by the Comptroller General as well as by Govern-
ment departments and agencies. The Comptroller General, in
developing bid protest procedures, has claimed his authority
5
«J. E. Welch, "The GAO in Government Procurement,"
Federal Ear Journal, XIV (February, 195^), 327.

lies in his obligation to ascertain whether appropriations
6
are correctly expended. Utilizing this claimed authority,
the Comptroller General published comprehensive protest
7procedures as late as 1968.
Without citing a specific authority, Government
departments and agencies have developed and published bid
protest procedures pertinent to their own areas. The most
basic procedures relative to bid protests have been published
by the Department of Defense and the General Services Adminis-
tration and are contained in the Armed Services Procurement
8 9Regulations and the Federal Procurement Regulations
respectively. The Armed Services Procurement Regulations
are applicable to all Department of Defense activities and
the Federal Procurement Regulations to most other federal
executive agencies. Implementing instructions have been
prepared at various levels within the departments and
agencies.
"The Comptroller General of the United States: The
Broad Power to Settle and Adjust All Claims and Accounts,"
Harvard Law Review
,
LXX (December, 1956), 357.
'U.S., Comptroller General, "Title 4—Accounts,"
Federal Register
,
XXXIII, No. 171 (August 31, 1968), 12288.
Q
U.S., Department of Defense, Armed Services Pro-
curement Regulations (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing
Office, 1969), pars. 2-407.9, 5-509.
Q
•'U.S., General Services Administration, Federal
Procurement Regulations (2d ed. ; Washington, D.C: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1964), par. 1-2.407-8.
\

Research Questions and Methodology
The utilization of the bid protest concept by an
unsuccessful bidder, and the resulting protest decision
rendered, has a certain impact on the involved Government
program, on the protestant, and, in some cases, on the
contract awardee. The objective of this project is to
determine whether Government procedures relative to pre-
award and post-award bid protests ensure fairness and
reasonableness in terms of this impact on the involved
programs and parties.
In searching for an answer to the question it will
first be necessary to determine the extent to which the
concept is properly utilized by industry and also to consider
the procedures established for submission, consideration,
and final determination of bid protests. Additionally, it
will be necessary to establish the basic considerations
involved in rendering protest decisions and the consistency
of those decisions. Finally, it will be necessary to
determine the nature of the impact on involved programs
and parties.
In conducting the necessary research, primary
emphasis will be placed on published Government procedures
relative to bid protests. Aside from published procedures,
very little has been written in the area of study. It is
anticipated that the void created by a lack of written
material will be filled through information gained from

interviews with Government contracting officers and legal
personnel. A large portion of the material will be drawn
from Comptroller General decisions, both published and
unpublished.
Presentation of the material will proceed from a
discussion relative to the use of the protest concept by
industry through an analysis of protest procedures and
protest decisions to a study of the impact of protest deci-
sions on involved programs and parties. A final presenta-
tion will consist of conclusions and certain recommendations
relative to protest procedures.
Scope of the Study
Bid protests, for purposes of this project, will be
defined as a protest against award of a contract, resulting
from either a formally advertised or a negotiated procure-
ment. Protests against a firm's small business status will
be excluded as they do not fit the accepted definitions of
a bid protest.
The vastness of the bid protest concept precludes a
study of all levels of Government procurement, and for this
reason the study will be limited to the Department of Defense
and the General Accounting Office. It is realized that
protestants may protest to Congressional levels when chal-
lenging Department of Defense procurements; however, it is
not the intent of this paper to discuss protests to
Congressional levels.

When discussing protests within the Department of
Defense, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
as well as the Defense Supply Agency will be considered.
Realizing that it is not feasible to survey and discuss each
sub-agency within the Departments mentioned, only a limited
sample of smaller field activities will be considered.
Prior to commencing this project it is necessary to
define the intended meanings of the words "fairness" and
"reasonableness" as used in this paper. The definitions
used will be those given in Webster's New World Dictionary :
fairness "implies the treating of both or all sides alike,
without reference to one's own feelings or interests";




BID PROTEST CONCEPT UTILIZATION BY INDUSTRY
Contractor Intent in Submission
of Bid Protests
The bid protest concept offers an invitation for
any unsuccessful bidder to challenge any determination that
is made in the course of awarding a contract. Bidders for
Government contracts have the right to require Government
agencies to follow their regulations in the formation of
contracts and the method by which this right is exercised
is the bid protest. In view of this approach it appears
logical to believe an unsuccessful bidder will submit a bid
protest when he believes the Government contracting officer
has deviated from established regulations. It is further
logical to believe the bidder expects an unbiased evaluation
of his protest and a subsequent adjustment which will align
the contract award with established regulations and possibly
facilitate his receiving the award.
Interviews with various Government officials and
contractor representatives indicate the logical intent is
not necessarily the primary factor in protest submission.
One Government lawyer has indicated that he believes many
Robert D. Witte, "Protesting the Award of Govern-
ment Contracts," Practical Lawyer
,
March, 1966, p. 59.
7

8unsuccessful bidders protest awards without valid justifi-
cation in order to delay the procurement, while hoping for
some unforeseen development which will void the expected
contract award. The lawyer further indicated that in
several cases of which he has knowledge the protestant could
not state any deviation from the regulations and in these




The above belief was supported by an Assistant
General Counsel of the General Accounting Office, who indi-
cated he had received many protests in which the protestant
did not and could not state a reason for the protest. He
also attributed this action to a desire on the part of the
protestant to unjustly delay the contract award. He further
indicated several protestants had informed him that they
protested in an effort to force changes to existing regu-
lations. Those protests as lodged did not point out
deviations from existing regulations but did attempt to
justify the protestant' s bidding actions and force a change
in regulations to coincide with the protestant ' s bid proce-
dures. This action was carried out in anticipation of
future awards and not in anticipation of receiving the
protested contract award.
2
G. Quigley, U.S. Naval Air Systems Command, Washing-
ton, D.C., interview, May, 1969.
x
^S. Haycock, General Accounting Office, Washington,
D.C., interview, May, 1969-

9A statement by a contractor representative tends
to lend credibility to the above mentioned ideas. One
attorney, who is actively engaged in preparing and present-
ing bid protests for contractor clients, indicated that he
and the clients, in many cases, knew the protests were not
valid; however, it was believed that if a contractor pro-
tested enough times the Government contracting officer
would, in an act of conscience, give special consideration
to the protesting contractor m future transactions.
It is reasonable to believe, from the above state-
ments, that Government intent in establishing the bid
protest concept and the contractor intent in utilizing the
concept are not necessarily in harmony.
Volume of Protests Submitted
to Government Agencies
Because of the number and complexity of Government
agencies which receive and process bid protests, the total
volume of protests is unknown. The United States Senate
attempted, in 1968, to gather data on the volume of bid
protests processed entirely at the contracting officer level
and discovered there was no information available. The
General Accounting Office maintains a record of protests
4
L. R. Brown, Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.,
interview, May, 1969.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Small
Business, Selected Problems ^of Small Business in the Area
of Federal Procurement
,





filed with that agency as do certain Department of Defense
agencies; however, there is no centralized collection point
for all protest data. The volume of protests submitted to
a limited number of Department of Defense agencies will be
utilized as indicators of the total volume.
General Accounting Office
The General Accounting Office processed and rendered
decisions on 339 bid protests during calendar year 1966. Of
these, 316 were denied and 23 were sustained. During calen-
dar year 1967, 391 bid protests were considered and of these,
361 were denied and 30 sustained. Calendar year 1968
resulted in an increase of bid protests to the level of
6
569, with 539 denied and 30 sustained. The first three
months of calendar year 1969 resulted in 103 bid protest
submissions to the General Accounting Office.
As evidenced by the figures above, bid protest sub-
missions in calendar year 1967 increased 17 per cent over
1966, and submissions in calendar year 1968 increased 46 per
cent over 1967. It is not possible to explain the large
increase between years 1967 and 1968; however, it is
feasible to believe that publication of General Accounting
Office procedures, relative to bid protests, during this
time period may have had some impact. It was during this
period that the General Accounting Office first publicly
Haycock, interview, May, 1969.

11
acknowledged the bid protest concept and published procedures
7to be utilized in submitting and processing bid protests.
It is also feasible to believe an increase in Government
expenditures during this period may have had some impact on
the increase.
Selected Department of Defense Agencies
In an effort to obtain an indication of the volume
of protests decided at the contracting officer level, a
limited number of procurement activities have been surveyed.
It is assumed the sample is representative of the population.
Statistics shown below represent formal written protests
submitted in accordance with specified procedures as opposed
to informal protests submitted by telephone and not followed
by a written confirmation. In each case it was noted that
the small number of protests considered did not warrant
detailed formal procedures and elaborate records. For this
reason the figures are considered to be approximations
rather than official figures.
Department of the Navy
Two United States Navy field purchasing activities
were surveyed relative to the volume of protests submitted
by the protestant directly to the contracting officer for
determination. The United States Naval Aviation Supply
Office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, estimates that four
?U.S., Comptroller General, "Title 4—Accounts,"




protests per month are received at that level. These pro-
tests result from a procurement program which involves
approximately 105,000 procurement actions and 1591,000,000
annually. A survey at the United States Naval Shipyard,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, indicated that, on the average,
one or two bid protests were received each month by that
9
activity. This volume of protests results from a procure-
ment program which involves approximately $41,000,000 and
58,000 procurement actions annually.
Department of the Army
A survey of the United States Army Mobility Equip-
ment Command in St. Louis, Missouri, indicated sixteen
protests had been received in the past ten months, for an
average of 1.6 per month. The purchasing program at this
activity results in approximately one-half the number of
procurement actions found at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard
and approximately one-half the dollar volume found at the
Aviation Supply Office.
Estimate of the population
It has been estimated above that three Department
of Defense field activities average slightly more than two
bid protest receipts per month. To estimate the total number
o
T. Bartman, U.S. Naval Aviation Supply Office,
Philadelphia, interview, March, 1969-
°B. Share, U.S. Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia,
interview, March, 1969.
10
G. Zelenak, U.S. Army Mobility Equipment Command,
St. Louis, telephone interview, May, 1969.

of bid protests received per year by Department of Defense
contracting officers it is only necessary to multiply the
annual figure of twenty-four by the number of Department of
Defense purchasing activities. Within the Department of the
Navy there are eleven major systems commands, one of which
is the Naval Supply Systems Command. There are sixty-four
field purchasing activities under the Naval Supply Systems
Command. This could indicate that this small portion of
the Department of Defense receives in excess of 1,536 bid
protests annually. The total Department of Defense volume
would be several times that stated above.
It has been stated by General Accounting Office
12 15personnel and by Department of the Army personnel y that
a vast majority of all bid protests are filed with and
resolved by the contracting officer. Data shown above tend
to lend credibility to statements by both parties.
Classification of Protest Categories
Major categories of bid protests appear to be well
agreed upon by knowledgeable authorities in the field.
Mr. R. D. Witte has stated that most bid protests tend to
be lodged in challenge to responsibility, responsiveness,
U.S., Department of the Navy, Headquarters, Naval
Material Command, Survey of Procurement Statistics
,
NAVMAT
Publication P-4200 (Washington, D.C., 1967), pp. 16-18.
12Haycock, interview, May, 1969-
1
^E. C. Cox, Army Policy Member, ASPR Committee,




and ambiguity. Department of the Navy personnel agree
that these are the three major categories and add a minor
category of protests involving a misunderstanding of procure-
15
ment regulations by the protestant. y Mr. Steve Haycock,






Protests in the area of responsibility are directed
toward the ability of a prospective contractor to meet
standards set forth in the Armed Services Procurement Regula-
tions (ASPR). These regulations state that a prospective
contractor must:
(i) have adequate financial resources, or the
ability to obtain such resources as required during
performance of the contract . . .
(ii) be able to comply with the required or
proposed delivery schedule . . .
(iii) have a satisfactory record of per-
formance . . .
(iv) have a satisfactory record of integrity;
and
(v) be otherwise qualified and eligible to
receive an award under applicable laws and regula-
tions. . . .17
14Witte, "Protesting the Award of Government
Contracts," pp. 62-66.
^G. Wade, U.S. Naval Supply Systems Command,
Washington, D.C., interview, May, 1969.
Haycock, interview, May, 1969.




A protest in this area stems from the belief of
an unsuccessful bidder that a successful bidder does not
and cannot meet the stated requirements. A review of the
standards cited above reveals that an actual determination
of responsibility by a Government contracting officer is
judgmental in nature. For example, the level of integrity
which is satisfactory is a judgmental determination.
Because of the lack of specified standards against
which to evaluate "responsibility protests," the General
Accounting Office has stated that "responsibility of a con-
tractor is primarily the function of the administrative
agency, not questioned by GAO in the absence of bad faith
or lack of a reasonable basis for determination." Thus,
it would appear that the General Accounting Office will
render protest decisions, relative to contractors'
responsibility, in only limited situations.
The contracting officer, in rendering decisions
on responsibility protests, may encounter two major
problems. ' These result from pre-award surveys and Small
Business Administration Certificates of Competency.
Pre-award surveys .—A protest in the category of
responsibility may be a direct contradiction to the validity
of a pre-award survey. "A pre-award survey is an evaluation
by a contract administration office of a prospective con-
tractor's capability to perform under the terms of a
18Comptroller General Decision B-165982 (1969).

16
19proposed contract." When an unsuccessful bidder, in sub-
mission of a bid protest, declares a prospective contractor
to be "nonresponsible" he is, in effect, declaring any exist-
ing pre-award survey to be invalid.
Certificate of competency .—The Small Business
Administration (SBA) "has statutory authority to certify the
competency of any small business concern as to capacity and
20
credit." In the event of a protest regarding the capacity
or credit of a small business concern, for which a Certifi-
cate of Competency has been issued, the contracting officer
is being requested to disregard the statutory authority of
the SBA. The contracting officer is required to accept a
Certificate of Competency as conclusive unless he has sub-
21
stantial doubt of the concern's ability to perform.
Responsiveness
To be considered responsive, "a bid must comply in
all material respects with the invitation for bids so that,
both as to the method and timeliness of submission and as to
the substance of any resulting contract, all bidders may stand
on an equal footing and the integrity of the formal adver-
22tising system may be maintained." A protest in the cate-
gory of responsiveness results when an unsuccessful bidder












has submitted a bid which is not responsive to the invitation
for bid.
Unlike a determination of responsibility which may be
judgmental in nature, a decision of responsiveness appears
to involve a comparison of the award or proposed award with
reasonably well-defined standards. This was indicated in a
particular Comptroller General decision, which stated:
"Unlike a determination of responsibility, which is factual
and as to which the contracting officer has wide discretion,
the determination by the contracting officer that DEPCO's
[the protestant's] bid was non responsive involves interpre-
tation of the invitation and bid and the application of
pertinent provisions of ASPR, and is a legal question which
23is subject to final review by this Office." ^
A dispute which may arise in determining responsive-
ness involves a determination of whether a bid irregularity
is minor or major. ASPR states that "a minor informality or
irregularity is one which is merely a matter of form or is
some immaterial variation from the exact requirements of the
24-invitation for bids. ..." Determination that an irregu-
larity is minor does not automatically reject a bid as non-
responsive. Herein lies another judgmental decision. A
deviation which appears to be minor to the contracting
^Comptroller General Decision B-161722 (1968).
24-







officer may appear major to an unsuccessful bidder and result
in a bid protest.
A prime example of the question of a minor or major
deviation is noted in a Comptroller General decision in which
a successful bidder failed to comply with the invitation by
disregarding the required statement relative to the F.O.B.
point of origin. An unsuccessful bidder protested to the
contracting officer, who in turn stated he had had several
previous contracts with the successful bidder and consequently
knew what F.O.B. point of origin was intended. As a result,
the contracting officer ruled the deviation a minor one and
proceeded with the award. The Comptroller General was not
so lenient and subsequently sustained the protest by declaring
25the deviation a major alteration. y
Ambiguity
Ambiguity protests, as contemplated by R. D. Witte,
result from ambiguity in the invitations for bid or in the
26
specifications themselves. Any ambiguity in either of
the above may result in a situation in which bidders prepare
their bids on different bases. The realization by an unsuc-
cessful bidder that the situation has occurred may result in
a bid protest.
An example which clarifies the concept of ambiguity
is a Comptroller General decision in which the protestant
^Comptroller General Decision B-165792 (1969)




stated that, due to ambiguous language in the invitation
relative to the quantity of items required, different
bidders used different pricing strategies. The case was






This minor category has been suggested by G. Wade,
of the United States Naval Supply Systems Command, who
contends that many protests result from a misunderstanding
28
of applicable regulations by the unsuccessful bidder. A
review of numerous protest cases revealed that many protests
in the categories of responsibility, responsiveness, and
ambiguity resulted indirectly from an inadequate understand-
ing of procurement regulations by the protestant. A further
review revealed there were actually protests resulting
directly from an inadequate understanding of the regu-
lations .
A case which clarified this category involved an
unsuccessful bidder's protest stating that he was a small
business concern and did not get the award because he was
declared nonresponsible due to an unsatisfactory record of
27Comptroller General Decision B-16571^ (1969)
28Wade, interview, May, 1969.

20
performance. The pre-award survey indicated a historical
delinquency rate which was not due to capacity or credit
and yet the protestant stated that he could not be ruled
nonresponsible in view of an existing SBA Certificate of
29Competency. Regulations state the Certificate of Compe-
50tency is applicable only to capacity and credit. The
protestant did not understand the regulations pertaining
to his protest.
Validity of Protests Submitted
A cursory review of General Accounting Office statis-
tics would tend to indicate that the reasons for protest
submission are, for the most part, invalid. In calendar year
1966, only twenty-three protests or approximately 7 per cent
were sustained. In calendar year 1967, thirty protests or
approximately 8 per cent were sustained. In calendar year
1968, protests sustained reached a new low of thirty or
51
approximately 5 per cent.
Further indicators of a lack of validity can be
drawn from certain statements discussed previously. Hay-
cock's statement that many contractors protest not neces-
sarily to win the award, but to bring about a change in
regulations, could indicate a lack of validity in bid
^Comptroller General Decision B-165982 (1969).




51v Haycock, interview, May, 1969.
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32protests. Prom L. Brown came the statement that his
clients protested with prior knowledge that the protest
would probably be denied but with the intent of playing on
the contracting officer's conscience to the extent he would
33give special consideration on the next procurement.
Another indicator of validity came from Quigley, who asserted
that protestants, in many cases, desired to delay an award
rather than prove the existence of a deviation from
34-
regulations. v
There are no figures available to determine the
validity of protests submitted to levels other than the
General Accounting Office; however, the United States Senate
has made an estimate of the situation. They have stated
that "no reliable success figures for bid protests filed
with the procurement agency head or headquarters are avail-
able, but on the basis of experience with congressional
intervention in these cases, it is very doubtful that the
quantity exceeds 10 per cent, and this only when the protest
35has been made prior to award." This figure is in line
with General Accounting Office data relative to validity
and subsequent successes of protests.
32
^ Haycock, interview, May, 1969.
33^Brown, interview, May, 1969.
34-
^ Quigley, interview, May, 1969.
35
-^Senate, Select Committee on Small Business,





When confronted with the above statistics and atti-
tudes it is difficult to believe the reasons for bid protest
submissions have more than limited validity; however, there
are certain other aspects which must be considered.
Included in the statistics pertaining to protests
that were denied were protests in the category of responsi-
bility. The Comptroller General has stated that "respon-
sibility of a contractor is primarily the function of the
administrative agency, not questioned by GAO in the absence
of bad faith or lack of a reasonable basis for determina-
tion." v The applicable case was denied and resulted in
another supporting statistic pertaining to the lack of
validity; however, the case may not in fact represent an
invalid protest. All that is actually demonstrated is that
the Comptroller General did not render a decision relative
to a responsibility determination by the contracting officer.
The validity of the protest had not been challenged and yet
the statistic, as reported, represents an invalid or
unsuccessful protest.
In another case reported as a denied protest, the
Comptroller General agreed with the protestant that his
offer had not been evaluated in accordance with sound pro-
curement practices, but further stated that the General
Accounting Office was "not disposed to question the award




... in view of the urgency of the requirement. " y! The
Comptroller General, basically, acknowledged the protest
validity hut denied the protest.
Further, General Accounting Office personnel readily
admit that many protest cases which have been denied could
just as easily have been sustained, but that the cost to the
Government in terms of dollars has a strong influence on the
58determination. In other words, the statistics for denied
protests include valid protests which would have been costly
to the Government if they had been sustained. It has been
stated that where the cost to the Government is large, the
General Accounting Office interprets applicable procurement
59
regulations very loosely m rendering protest decisions.
In essence, even though available statistics indi-
cate a lack of validity in protest submissions, there is
evidence of certain mitigating situations which decrease
the validity of the statistics and increase the validity of
bid protests. It is feasible to believe, based on available
evidence, that many protests are in fact submitted for
invalid reasons but that fewer invalid protests are submitted
than the statistics indicate.
^Comptroller General Decision B-162465 (1968)
58J Haycock, interview, May, 1969-




ANALYSIS OF PROTEST PROCEDURES
Review of Basic Parameters
Basic instructions, relative to determination of
bid protests, have been published by the Comptroller General
and by the Department of Defense and appear in the Federal
1 2Register and the Armed Services Procurement Regulations
respectively. These instructions provide the basic
parameters by which bid protests are determined.
Comptroller General
Comptroller General rules and regulations, as pub-
lished, make no distinction between pre-award and post-award
protests. Further, the rules and regulations make no dis-
tinction between negotiated and advertised awards. At the
Comptroller General level of authority one set of published
rules is used for all types of bid protests.
The rules provide that an interested party wishing
to protest a proposed award or an award already made may
do so by notifying the Comptroller General by telegram or
Comptroller General, "Title 4—Accounts" (1968),
p. 12288.







letter. The notification must include information identify-
ing the procurement, the agency concerned, and the specific
grounds upon which the protest is based. The protestant is
further requested to provide a copy of the protest to the
contracting officer of the involved agency.
The rules provide an opportunity for involved parties
that might be adversely affected by the protest to present
views prior to rendering of a final decision, unless time
does not permit. The rules further provide that, consistent
with other regulations, the General Accounting Office will
5provide full protest data to the involved parties.
The published rules of the Comptroller General
provide valuable information to the parties involved in a
bid protest; however, as published, they do not discuss
internal procedures utilized in the process. This aspect
will be discussed in a later section. It should be noted
that the published regulations contain no mention of time
frames for protest determination.
Comptroller General rules and regulations pertinent
to bid protests are not implemented by other instructions
as are Department of Defense procedures contained in the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations. Comptroller General






rules and regulations in this area are based on the authority
6granted in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.
Department of Defense
Department of Defense rules and regulations relative
to bid protests are published in the Armed Services Procure-
rs
ment Regulations (ASPR)' issued under the authority of the
o
Armed Services Procurement Act of 194-7 • It is interesting
to note that in the Act, no apparent or specific authority
is granted relative to determination of bid protests.
Regulations provide that contracting officers shall
consider all pre-award and post-award protests and that if
the protest is oral and cannot be otherwise resolved, written
9
confirmation of the protest shall be requested.
Determination of the bid protest decision necessi-
tates consideration of the Comptroller General ' s views only
when it is considered desirable.
ASPR provides that, in cases of pre-award protests,
the contracting officer shall give notice of the protest
to bidders affected by the protest and shall request the
bidders to extend the time for acceptance of their bids.
6Budget and Accounting Act, 42 Stat. 24 (1921).
7




8Armed Services Procurement Act, 10 U.S.G. 137 (19'









If the bidders do not consent to an extension of bid times,
the contracting officer is to consider proceeding with the
award
.
ASPR permits the contracting officer to proceed with
the contract award, under certain conditions, even when con-
fronted with a pre-award protest. The conditions necessary
for proceeding with the award must be determined by the
contracting officer and include:
(i) The items to be procured are urgently
required; or
(ii) Delivery or performance will be unduly
delayed by failure to make award promptly; or
(iii) A prompt award will otherwise be advan-
tageous to the Government. 12
The actions must be documented and all parties notified of
the decision to proceed with award.
Determination to proceed with award, when a protest
has been lodged directly with the Comptroller General, must
be approved at a level of authority higher than the contract-
ing officer. The intent to proceed with award will be
transmitted to the Comptroller General, and his views rela-
15tive to the protest obtained, prior to award. v
Regulations pertinent to post-award protests are
not contained in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations.















award shall be handled in accordance with Departmental
procedures.
"
Procedures discussed above pertain to protests of
procurements by formal advertising. Relative to protests
of procurements by negotiation, the regulations state that
"protests against awards of negotiated procurements shall be
treated substantially in accordance with 2-407.9 [relating
15
to protests against formally advertised procurements]." -'
In essence, the basic parameters established by the
ASPR are void of procedures relative to post-award protests.
Further, the regulations make no valid distinction between
advertised and negotiated procurement protests. One obvious
deficiency in the ASPR relates to time frames. There is no
mention of any mandatory time frames for processing bid
protests.
It is interesting to note that although the
Comptroller General appears to have statutory authority
behind his regulations the Department of Defense has no
direct statutory authority to determine bid protests. Even
without apparent statutory authority the Department of
Defense authorizes contracting officers to render protest
decisions with the advice of the Comptroller General con-
sidered only when deemed desirable. This would appear to










protests. The conflict is even more apparent in the area
in which the Department of Defense allows contract award,
prior to protest determination by the Comptroller General,
without approval of the Comptroller General. This appears
to contradict the authority of the Comptroller General.
Review of Implementing Procedures
The basic regulations, provided in ASPR, are imple-
mented by various instructions published by the Defense
Supply Agency and by the Departments of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force. Implementing instructions published by these
agencies range from complex and all-inclusive to very
simple.
Department of the Army
Department of the Army procedures are published in
the Army Procurement Procedure (APP). Procedures rela-
tive to bid protests are contained in the section which
discusses formal advertising, with no mention of protests
against negotiated awards.
The procedures provide that the contracting officer
shall attempt to resolve a protest unless he considers it
desirable to submit the protest to a higher authority, or
he considers it desirable to obtain the opinion of the
Comptroller General before award or the protestant indicates
U.S., Department of the Army, Army Procurement
Procedure (Washington, D.C., 1969), par. 2-407.9.
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17that he intends to carry the protest to a higher authority. '
It is rather obvious that the procedures reduce the author-
ity of the contracting officer in settling protests. Whereas
ASPR states that the contracting officer shall consider all
bid protests, the APP qualifies the type of protests to be
considered by the contracting officer.
The procedures are very explicit in the area relative
to protests submitted to higher authorities. In those cases
the APP requires a report from the contracting officer which
includes: (1) a signed statement from the protestant setting
forth facts and the basis of the protest; (2) a signed state-
ment from other involved parties affected by the protest,
indicating their position; (3) a copy of the protestant '
s
bid and a copy of the bid being considered for award; (4-) a
copy of the solicitation; (5) a copy of the abstract of bids;
(6) copies of any other relevant documents; and (7) a signed
statement by the contracting officer relevant to his findings,
action taken to resolve the protest and the results, and the
1 Pi
contracting officer's recommendations.
APP further identifies the chain of command involved
in submissions to authorities higher than the Head of Pro-
curing Activity (HPA). Protests emanating from purchasing
offices under cognizance of Headquarters, Army Material









19Counsel, Headquarters, Army Material Command. y Protests
emanating from purchasing offices under cognizance of the
Chief of Engineers are to be forwarded to the Chief of
Engineers, who will forward them to the Comptroller
20General. Each authority in the chain of command will add
recommendations to those of the contracting officer.
Relative to proceeding with a protested award, the
contracting officer may make the award pursuant to ASPR
2-407.9(b) (3) ; however, he must forward copies of his
decision to the HPA and to any higher authority to which the
21protestant has indicated he may protest. This procedure
differs in cases where the contracting officer forwards the
pre-award protest to higher authorities for disposition.
In such cases, the contracting officer must have authority
22from the higher authorities prior to award.
The area of post-award protests is equally as vague
as the ASPR. APP states that the HPA is to be notified
immediately upon receipt of a post-award protest. If it
appears that the award may be invalid, and there will be
subsequent delay of material under the contract, the con-
tracting officer, subject to authority from the HPA, is








22Ibid. par. 2-407. 9(h).
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with the contractor unless the action is prejudicial to the
Government. If the contractor does not consent to a stop
work order the HPA may direct issuance of the order. In no
case is the contracting officer allowed to take action




Defense Supply Agency regulations are published in
24the Defense Supply Procurement Regulations (DSPR). The
regulations make no reference to protests of negotiated
awards and, additionally, are limited to those procedures
necessary to process protests submitted to authorities
higher than the contracting officer.
Pre-award procedures relative to protests sub-
mitted to higher authority or the Comptroller General
provide that no award will be made until the protest is
resolved or the utilization of the requirements of
ASPR 2-407. 9(b) (3) are approved by the Counsel, Defense
25Supply Agency. v Content of the report and file forwarded
by the contracting officer to the Counsel is the same as
that required by the APP.
Post-award protest procedures are equally as vague




24U.S. , Defense Supply Agency, Defense Supply Pro-








to Army procedures in requiring an attempt to reach a mutual
stop work agreement with the contractor and a possible
issuance of a stop work order in the event such agreement
cannot be reached. The necessary guidance from higher
authority is provided by the Counsel, Defense Supply
Agency.
In summary, the Defense Supply Agency makes no
provision for protests submitted to the contracting officer
and further provides for the higher level of authority to
be the Counsel. The instructions for post-award protests
are vague at best.
Department of the Navy
Department of the Navy procedures are published in
27the Navy Procurement Directives (NPD). ' No separate pro-
visions are made for negotiated procurement protests. The
directives provide that prior to proceeding with an award
protested to the Comptroller General, the contracting
officer must receive authority from a higher level within
the purchasing activity. Notice of intent to make award
must be routed through the Command, Bureau, or Headquarters
which advised the contracting officer of the protest.
Further, award is to be withheld until advice of the Comp-





'U.S., Department of the Navy, Navy Procurement
Directives
,





received. The directives provide no guidance for pre-
award protests submitted directly to the contracting officer.
Navy directives provide that post-award protests
shall be handled in accordance with ASPR 2-4-07. 9(a) when they
are addressed only to the purchasing activity; however, the
views of the Systems Command, Bureau, or Headquarters should
be obtained in the matter. Post-award protests submitted
to the Comptroller General require a report from the pro-
curing activity and the regulations simply require that the
report contain all information necessary to reply to the
protest. The report is forwarded via the Systems Command,
Bureau, or Headquarters which forwarded notice of the
29protest to the procuring activity. It should be noted that
the regulations are less comprehensive and less stringent
than those of the other services.
Department of the Air Force
Department of the Air Force procedures are published
50in the Air Force Procurement Instructions (AFPI). The
procedures provide a responsibility for the contracting
officer to decide, with concurrence of the local staff judge








' U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Pro-
curement Instructions (Washington, D.C. , 1968), par. 2-407. 9.
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and to take the action necessary to rectify the situation
if such a basis exists.
A minor contradiction appears to exist in the
procedures. The contracting officer is required to submit
denied protests, or protests in which the contracting
officer desires views of higher authority, to the Air Force
Logistics Command (AFLC) or the Air Force Systems Command
(AFSC) as appropriate. The report is to be comprised of
basically the same information as that requested by the
APP and DSPR. The contradiction appears to occur where
authority is granted for the contracting officer to
dispense with submission of denied protests, to AFLC and
AFSC, if he is satisfied that the protest is without a
32
reasonable degree of foundation.
The procedures provide that prior to proceeding
with award under the provisions of ASPR 2-4-07. 9(b) (3)
,
when the award has been protested to the Comptroller
General, the contracting officer must have approval from
x.x
Headquarters, United States Air Force. v
Provisions for post-award protests are virtually
nonexistent. The procedures state that all post-award
protests will be processed at AFLC or AFSC and that the
51 Ibid.
,










contracting officer's report will contain the same
34-information as required in pre-award protests.
Pre-award and post-award protests may be considered
by the Director of Procurement and Production (MCP) or the
Assistant to the Director, Headquarters AFLC, or by the
Deputy Chief of Staff/Procurement and Production or Assistant
Deputy Chief of Staff/Procurement and Production, Head-
quarters, AFSC, in the event the protests are lodged at a
level no higher than the major command or subordinate field
35
organization level.
The procedures further provide that pre-award and
post-award protests filed at Headquarters USAF or higher
will be forwarded through AFLC or AFSC. 56
As with regulations and procedures of the other
services, the AFPI procedures relative to bid protests are
included under the section relative to formally advertised
procurement with no mention of negotiated procurement
protests.
Comparison of Actual Procedures
with Basic Parameters and
Implementing Procedures
Published Comptroller General rules and regulations
give a rather broad coverage of protest procedures. The












Comptroller General level involve assignment of the protest
to a General Accounting Office attorney for action. The
attorney subsequently notifies, by telephone, designated
personnel at the involved procuring agency and requests a
report relative to the protested award. Based on the report
the protest decision is rendered. It was noted that protests
were not necessarily determined in the order in which they
were received, but were, on occasion, determined in order
37
of importance.
A survey of certain Department of Defense agencies
revealed that actual procedures utilized in determination
of bid protests were primarily in accordance with the basic
parameters and implementing instructions. The ASPR, however,
refers to the contracting officer as the rendering body while
the implementing instructions make reference to legal counsel
vice the contracting officer. In most cases the actual pro-
test determinations or recommendations are prepared by the
legal counsel with assistance from the procurement personnel.
The Naval Ship Systems Command procedures provide
for the Office of Counsel to receive protests and to obtain
assistance from technical and contracting personnel in
rendering the decision. In that Command, "bid protests are
handled directly by one organizational entity—Office of
Counsel, SHIPS 00J." 58
^'Haycock, interview, May, 1969.
38Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command, letter to
Chief of Naval Material, April 25, 1969.
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The internal procedures followed by the Naval
Supply Systems Command involve comparison of the protest
with the proposed award or existing award and a comparison
against the ASPR relative to procurement procedures.
Following this review and comparison by contracting per-
sonnel, the protest is submitted to legal counsel for
review, to determine legality. Based on these reviews, a
59letter relative to the protest is prepared.
With the exception of the Comptroller General
rules, which do not set forth actual working procedures,
agencies rendering protest decisions appear to follow the
procedures prescribed in the basic and implementing
instructions. The working procedures at the agency level,
in those agencies reviewed, indicated the process to be
one of interaction between legal personnel and contracting
personnel.
59




ANALYSIS OF PROTEST DECISIONS
Basic Considerations in Determination
A complete protest decision is twofold in nature.
It includes a determination relative to denying or sustain-
ing the objection submitted by the protestant and it also
includes, providing the protested contract has been awarded,
a determination of disposition of the existing contract.
As will be discussed later, the two aspects of a decision
are not always in complete harmony.
The first consideration in rendering a protest
decision is the legality of the award or proposed award.
It is not the intent of this study to define legality in
its entirety; rather, legality will be discussed in terms
of actions of, based upon, or authorized by law. The
intended meaning of the word "law" relates to applicable
statutes and regulations.
i
The second consideration in rendering a protest
decision involves the concept of best interest of the
Government and it has been indicated that this aspect may
be the primary factor in rendering protest decisions.




It is doubtful whether a contracting officer, when deciding
a protest, will openly admit a mistake in designating the
original awardee. Further, the General Accounting Office,
in rendering a decision, is charged by statute with protect-
ing the interests of the Government. Therefore, because
these are the two major decision rendering bodies, a protest
decision may be more heavily influenced by the concept of
best interest than by the concept of legality.
Legality
The legality of an award or a proposed award is
considered in terms relative to governing statutes and
regulations. Determinations of legality appear more feasible
in protests against advertised awards than against negoti-
ated awards due to the fact that advertised procurements
may be evaluated against objective standards while negoti-
ated procurements result from numerous subjective decisions
2
and to a degree defy objective evaluation. The objective
standards are those set forth in the Armed Services
Procurement Act.
Evaluation of negotiated procurement protests
becomes rather "gray," and as a result judgmental in nature,
because of the lack of objective standards against which
2Witte, "Protesting the Award of Government
Contracts," p. 59
2305 (19^7).




to evaluate them. A term which appeared in a large number
of negotiated procurement protest decisions reviewed related
to the contracting officer's unsound exercise of discretion
with no violation of law or regulation. This results
directly from the lack of a set of standards against which
to compare negotiated procurement protests.
Determinations of legality are sometimes complicated
by technical questions in the protest. Since the General
Accounting Office has no scientists or technical personnel
on its staff it is sometimes necessary to rely on the pro-
curing agency's recommendation when determining the legality
of an award or proposed award.
Interest of the Government
As mentioned previously, a protest decision is the
result of an ex parte process in which the Government renders
a decision on a Government action. "This means that, when
the interests of the Government and those of the protester
clash, the Comptroller General must decide the case in
terms of the best interests of the Government."^ As a
result, the concepts of legality and best interest are
sometimes in conflict, as noted in cases in which a protest
is sustained but the existing contract is not disturbed.
It has been stated that when a large amount of money is
4Wade, interview, May, 1969.
5
*3enate, Select Committee on Small Business,
Selected Problems of Small Business, p. 12.
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involved, the General Accounting Office tends to interpret
the laws and regulations very loosely. This statement has
been substantiated by General Accounting Office personnel,
who have stated that both money and time have a large influ-
n
ence on final decisions. In the final analysis, a protest
decision may result in a conflict of principle versus time
and money in which the Government is more interested in
time and money than in principle.
Money
As a guardian of Government funds the Comptroller
General is bound to protect those funds and ensure that they
are wisely spent. Steve Haycock, of the General Accounting
Office, has stated that costs are considered very closely
before rendering a protest decision which could result in
an unnecessary expense to the Government. This principle
explains the Comptroller General's decision in many bid
protest cases in which it was conceded that the protester
was correct in the contention that the contract had been
improperly awarded to someone else, but that no remedy could
be given the protester because to cancel the contract
9
would be either impractical or prohibitively expensive.
Quigley, interview, May, 1969.
7
'Haycock, interview, May, 1969.
8Ibid.
9Senate, Select Committee on Small Business,




The element of time, or how fast the Government
needs the material under the protested contract, is always
ascertained prior to rendering a protest decision. If the
material is urgently required, it is feasible the award will
not be disturbed. In one apparently common decision the
Comptroller General agreed that the protestant's bid had not
been evaluated in accordance with sound procurement practices,
but further stated that he was not disposed to question the
award in view of the urgency of the requirement. Time was
considered more heavily than principle in the case.
Time Necessary to Render
Protest Decisions
It has been stated that, to be effective, "deci-
sions in bid protest cases must be timely and cannot be sub-
jected to time-consuming procedures that are not essential
12
to disposition of the protest." A review of bid protest
decisions reveals that they are not necessarily timely.
As mentioned previously, a protest submitted to the
Comptroller General requires that the office request a
report relative to the award from the procuring agency.
The procuring agency prepares the report and forwards it
Haycock, interview, May, 1969.
"^Comptroller General Decision B-162465 (1968).
12U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, GAP Bid Protest Procedures , 'H. Rept. 113^,
90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 3.

44
through the chain of command to the Comptroller General,
who renders the final decision.
The Department of the Army has summarized the time
required for preparation and submission of a protest report
to the General Accounting Office. It states that four to
seven days elapse from the time the General Accounting
Office requests a report until the Head of the Procuring
Activity receives the request. Approximately thirty addi-
tional days are required for preparation of the contracting
officer's report and an additional seven to ten days for
final review through the chain of command prior to dispatch
to the General Accounting Office. The summary estimates
that on the average it takes the Army forty-two days to
process the report.
The Defense Supply Agency's estimate for a similar
14process is thirty days. The Department of the Air Force
15
claims an average of forty days. y An average of the time
periods required by six major Naval Commands indicates that
it takes twenty-eight days to process the report. A review
of Navy figures showed times ranging from fifteen to
seventy-three days for preparation of the report.
1-5
^Cox, letter to the Chairman, DOD, ASPR Committee.
14
E. P. Cole, Defense Supply Agency, Washington,
D.C., interview, May, 1969.
15^Senate , Select Committee on Small Business,




J. D. Blanchard, Office of the Chief of Naval
Material, Washington, D.C., interview, May, 1969.
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The General Accounting Office has recently estab-
lished a new procedure whereby, upon receipt of the protest
at that office, the assigned counsel notifies the involved
procurement agency of a pending protest by phone. It seems
feasible that this could reduce the process by four to
seven days since this is the average time that has been
allotted for the procuring agency to receive the written
protest. Interviews with numerous procurement personnel
revealed a degree of appreciation for receiving advance
warning of a protest; however, the procurement personnel
also revealed a degree of hesitancy about starting all
necessary action until receipt of the written protest.
After receipt of the report by the General Account-
ing Office it is presently estimated that an additional
17forty-two days are required to render the final decision. '
This would tend to indicate that at a minimum a protest
submitted to the General Accounting Office would take, on
the average, seventy days, and at a maximum could take
eighty-four days, to receive a final decision. The time
factor involved in rendering a protest decision is the
1 P>biggest problem area at the present time.
Protests submitted directly to the contracting offi-
cer appear to be less time consuming than those submitted
17





to the General Accounting Office. The time factor is
reduced by eliminating the delay of seven to ten days
required to transmit the report through the chain of com-
mand and by eliminating the delay of four to seven days
required to transmit the request for a report to the pro-
curing agency. The biggest time factor eliminated is, of
course, the forty-two days required by the General Account-
ing Office to review the case and render a final decision.
In light of this shorter time period, protest decisions
rendered by contracting officers may be more equitable to
all concerned parties than those submitted to the General
Accounting Office. This concept is discussed later in
this chapter and is expanded further in Chapter V.
Consistency of Decisions
Consistency of protest decisions may be evaluated
in terms of decisions rendered by contracting officers and
subsequently protested to the Comptroller General for a
final decision or in terms of decisions on different
protests, of a similar nature, rendered by the same agency.
Consistency of Decisions Rendered
by the Comptroller General and
by the Contracting Officer
There is evidence to indicate that, although a
majority of decisions rendered by contracting officers are
supported by the Comptroller General, some decisions are
not sustained. The Commander, Naval Electronics Systems
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Command has reported that of nineteen bid protests resolved
by the General Accounting Office during fiscal year 1968
and the first three quarters of fiscal year 1969, the Com-
19
mand ' s judgment was sustained m sixteen cases. y The
Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command has reported that
during the same time period the General Accounting Office
resolved 14-6 protests involving the Command and sustained
20the Command's judgment in 141 of these cases. These
figures promote the idea that the contracting officer and
the General Accounting Office normally agree on protest
decisions and would render consistent decisions most of
the time.
There are, as mentioned, cases in which the con-
tracting officer and the Comptroller General disagree in
their decisions. In one such instance the contracting
officer ruled on a protest against the responsiveness of
the awardee ' s bid. The contracting officer determined the
deviation in the awardee ' s bid was a minor deviation, as
provided in ASPR 2-405, and denied the protest. The Comp-
troller General subsequently received the protest from the
protestant and sustained it, maintaining that the deviation
21
was major and was not provided for by ASPR 2-405- A
19^ Commander, Naval Electronics Systems Command,
letter to the Chief of Naval Material, April 22, 1969.
20Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command, letter
to the Chief of Naval Material, April 25, 1969.
21Comptroller General Decision B-165792 (1969).
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review of the figures above reveals that these cases seldom
occur, possibly because both agencies are protecting the
Government's interests.
Consistency of Decisions
by the Same Agency
As mentioned previously, protests of negotiated
procurements involve a review of many judgmental decisions
made in awarding the contract. This is opposed to a protest
of an advertised procurement in which objective standards
are available against which to compare the award procedures.
It is feasible that inconsistencies in legality determina-
tions are possible when rendering protest decisions resulting
from judgmental or subjective bases. It has been stated
that many protest decisions, when received, can be argued in
22favor of either party--the Government or the protestant.
This could promote a belief that inconsistencies may occur
in protest decisions.
One obvious thread of inconsistency is evident in
the decisions rendered by the same activity and this relates
to disposition of existing contracts. The disposition of
an existing contract appears to depend a great deal on the
best interest of the Government at the time. To illustrate
this idea: Two Comptroller General decisions are available.
Both protests were sustained but disposition of the existing
contracts was different and inconsistent.
22Haycock, interview, May, 1969.
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In one case the contract was in an advanced state
of completion and the decision subsequently stated:
".
. . practical considerations preclude our disturbing
25the award. ..." In the second case a stop work order
had been issued ten days after award and this resulted in





The Department of Defense has, without statutory
authority, stated that the "contracting officers shall con-
sider all protests or objections to the award of a contract
25
whether submitted before or after award." y This statement
provides the contracting officer with authority to render
a protest decision; however, it provides no degree of
finality to any decisions rendered by the contracting
officer. The protestant is not bound by the contracting
officer's decision and, if he chooses, may submit the
protest to the Comptroller General for final determination.
Comptroller General
The Comptroller General appears to have final
authority in rendering protest decisions. He claims the
^Comptroller General Decision B-157150 (1966).
^Comptroller General Decision B-161722 (1968).
25^Department of Defense, Armed Services Procurement
Regulations, par. 2-407. 9(a).
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statutory authority to settle all claims and demands
against the Government, as provided in the Budget and
26Accounting Act of 1921, which provides an obligation to
ensure that contracts involving public funds are legally
made. It is within this framework of authority and obli-
gation that the Comptroller General considers bid protests.
Enforcement of this authority is attained through
the authority of the Comptroller General to withhold payment
27
under the contract if his decision is not honored. ' This
is obvious in numerous decisions in which the Comptroller
General states that a certain contract "would be considered
improper by our Office and we would be constrained to
apply this view in the audit of expenditures of appropri-
28
ated funds under any contract for the services in question."
The Courts
It might appear that the courts would be the final
authority on protest decisions; however, this is not neces-
sarily true as the courts will normally not accept a bid
protest for determination. There are numerous court rulings
which reject bid protests at that level; the most well known
is a Supreme Court ruling in which it is stated:
The interference of the courts with the performance
of the ordinary duties of the executive departments
^ Budget and Accounting Act, 42 Stat. 24 (1921).
27Ibid
.
28Comptroller General Decision B-161782 (1967).
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of the Government would be productive of nothing but
mischief and we are quite satisfied that such a power
was never intended to be given to them. 29
This ruling, as well as others of a similar nature,
substantiates the Comptroller General's claim to be the
final authority in determination of bid protests. The
Supreme Court obviously considers the consideration of bid
protests to be an ordinary duty of the executive depart-
ments.
Although the courts do not render ordinary protest
decisions, there is at least one instance in which the
courts considered, not the protest, but instead, the deci-
sion previously rendered by the Comptroller General. In
the case, the Comptroller General ruled the award was
invalid and was to be cancelled with no relief to the
awardee; however, the Court of Claims overruled the relief
portion of the decision and declared the awardee was to
receive relief as in a termination for convenience
50
settlement.
The apparent conclusion is that the Comptroller
General is the final authority to which a protest may be
submitted; however, the courts may, in limited cases, review
a decision and grant some relief of a quasi-contractual
nature.
2<5Perkins v. Luken Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1939).
5
°John Reiner & Co.»"v. United States, 163 Ct. CI.
381, 325 F. 2d. 438.
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Influence on Contract Award
Influence of protest decisions on contract award
differs slightly between pre-award and post-award protests.
These will be discussed separately; however, it can be noted
that the influence is similar in certain respects.
Pre-Award
As mentioned previously, rendering a protest deci-
sion may take an average of seventy to eighty-four days if
the decision is to be rendered by the Comptroller General.
It is obvious that this action can have an impact of delay-
ing contract award for a long period of time unless the
contracting officer certifies applicability of the ASPR
31
requirements which allow award.
In the event the contract award is made under the
ASPR criteria and the protest is denied, there is virtually
no impact on the contract award. If, however, the contract
is awarded and the protest is sustained after award, the
influence may be considered the same as that of a post-award
protest.
Pre-award protest decisions in which the protest
is sustained may have varying degrees of influence. The
decision may alter determination of the proper awardee and
allow award to the next eligible bidder. The decision may
pertain to defective specifications or to a defective






invitation, for bids and thereby force readvertisement and
renegotiation of the contract prior to award.
Post-Award
Post-award protest decisions, although similar to
pre-award decisions, appear to have a more serious influ-
ence or impact on contract award. A denied post-award
protest has little, if any, impact on contract award unless
a stop work order has been issued and the work halted
pending determination of the protest; however, a sustained
post-award protest may result in one of several alternatives
relative to the awarded contract.
A decision which sustains a protest may also demand
cancellation of an existing contract with or without
reimbursement to the awardee. This appears to be the most
serious aspect of a post-award protest decision. Such a
cancellation may allow award to the next eligible bidder
or may, if the specification or the invitation is defective,




IMPACT OF BID PROTEST DECISIONS
The rendering of a protest decision by the General
Accounting Office or by a Government contracting officer
has a definite impact on all parties and programs concerned
with the contract award. Of major importance is the impact
on Government programs, the impact on the protesting party,
and the impact on the contract awardee, in the event the
decision is rendered after contract award. The impact on
each of these will be discussed in this chapter.
Impact on Government Programs
The impact on Government programs is most appropri-
ately discussed in terms of the time delay encountered in
receiving final decisions, the cost impact resulting from
a successful bid protest, and finally, the impact of
General Accounting Office decisions on Government procurement
regulations.
Time Delay
As discussed in Chapter IV of this paper, there is
a long delay in receiving bid protest decisions. In a
situation where a contract has not been awarded, but is




involved Government program may be halted unless the
contracting officer determines that:
(i) The items to be procured are urgently
required; or
(ii) Delivery or performance will be unduly
delayed by failure to make award promptly; or
(iii) A prompt award will otherwise be
advantageous to the Government.!
A situation of this nature has been related by the
2
contracting officer of the Naval Ordnance Systems Command.
The procurement involved two separate contracts for two
items which necessarily required "mating" and assembly at
the second contractor's plant. The items formed a portion
of a Navy torpedo. Award of one contract to manufacture one
of the two parts and mate it with the other part when
received was carried out. The other contract was protested
and award subsequently delayed since the contracting officer
did not feel he could at that time justify the requirements
stated in the ASPR. The protest of one contract for one
small item subsequently resulted in a delay of the entire
torpedo assembly.
A secondary condition which may develop during the
long time delay involves changing market conditions.
Theoretically, a change in the cost of raw materials, con-
tractor capability, and so on, could invalidate any data
being utilized by the Government for determining the proper





D. G. Aitken, U.S. Naval Ordnance Systems Command,
Washington, D.C., interview, February, 1969.
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awardee and could subsequently result in additional delays
and increased costs.
Another, and probably more important, concept of
the time delay aspect involves those relatively few cases
in which a contract has been awarded only to have the General
Accounting Office demand termination of the contract. At
the point of termination a contracting officer may find it
necessary to readvertise the invitation and start the
process anew, causing an excessive delay.
A severe case of this nature is presently in
process at the United States Naval Aviation Supply Office
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. A contract for urgently
required material was awarded and subsequently protested on
the basis of nonresponsiveness. The protest was lodged
with the contracting officer, who denied the protest in
January, 1969. At that point the contract was less than
one month old.
The unsuccessful bidder subsequently protested to
the Comptroller General, who, in early March, 1969, after
Zj_
long deliberation, also denied the protest. At the end of
March the Comptroller General indicated that he had reviewed
the decision and was probably going to reverse the decision
and demand cancellation of the contract. At the present
^Bartman, interview, March, 1969.
4Comptroller General Decision B-165792 (1969).
5
^Bartman, interview, March, 1969.
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point in time, May, 1969, the final decision is still
pending and the first item delivery is due in June , 1969.
If the Comptroller General demands termination of
the contract at this time, a minimum of twelve months will
have been lost in procuring an urgently required item.
These twelve months include the six months which will have
elapsed in addition to six months to return to the present
position if another contractor gets the award.
Cost Impact
The cost impact on Government programs takes on an
aspect of major importance in cases in which protests are
sustained and contract cancellation demanded. Statistics
indicate that in calendar years 1966 through 1968, the
General Accounting Office demanded cancellation in only
eleven of the bid protests considered; however, the eleven,
in dollar amount, may represent a large impact on Government
programs.
The protest discussed previously, involving the
United States Aviation Supply Office, is an excellent
example of the cost aspect of a cancellation resulting from
a bid protest. Prior to rendering a decision, in March,
1969, the General Accounting Office received information
stating that termination costs on the $4,628,251.50 con-
tract would be approximately $420, 000. This figure was
computed to February 21, 1969.
Comptroller General Decision B-165792 (1969).

58
In an interview at the contracting agency on
March. 31, 1969, it was determined that termination costs
n
then exceeded $1 million. At this writing, May, 1969,
the final decision has not been rendered; however, indi-
cations are that the contract very probably will be
cancelled.
Cancellation costs such as those mentioned above
tend to result in not only more expensive procurements, but
also a distortion in the budgeting process. At the incep-
tion of the contract period a given dollar amount is allocated
to the contract, only to find several months later that the
budget must be increased to provide funds necessary for
termination and reprocurement
.
Impact on Procurement Procedures
It is not uncommon, when reviewing Comptroller
General decisions, to note many cases in which the Comp-
troller General requests or suggests changes to established
procurement procedures as a result of bid protest decisions.
During the period July 1, 1967 through December 31,
1967, 206 bid protests resulted in 4-2 cases in which the
Comptroller General recommended that agency procedures be
9improved.
7
'Bartman, interview, March, 1969-
^ade, interview, May, 1969.
9Senate, Select Committee on Small Business,





In a protest decision relating to late proposals,
the Comptroller General has stated:
Thus we are proposing really one change in the current
procedure. Although the statute (2$04[g] ) does state
that RPP's should advise "of the possibility that award
may be made without discussion" , we believe a more
definite statement of intention is needed in solicita-
tions in order to remove some of the uncertainty
contained in the current procedure. . . .10
Actions of this nature may result in changed procurement
procedures in some cases.
Impact on the Protestant
Bid protest decisions may result in the protestant'
s
gaining his objective of forcing termination of an existing
contract and subsequently receiving the contract award, or
the protestant may force contract termination only to find
himself in the position of third low bidder and subsequently
fail to receive the award. A third, and more common, situ-
ation is one in which the protestant wins the protest
decision, but in which no action is taken against an existing
contract. The final situation is, of course, the denied
protest.
Sustained Protest with No Contract
Cancellation Demanded
Situations in which the protestant wins the deci-
sion but in which no action is taken against the existing
contract appear to be most common. Statistics indicate
that of the protests considered by the General Accounting
Comptroller General Decision B-161782 (1967)
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Office from fiscal year 1963 through 1966, thirty-one were
sustained but the contract was cancelled in only ten of
these cases. More current statistics reveal that
1,299 "bid protests were considered by the General Accounting
Office between calendar years 1966 and 1968 and that of
these, eighty-three were sustained. Only eleven of the
eighty-three decisions demanded cancellation of an existing
12
contract. The result of these cases was that the pro-
testant won the protest but lost the award. The usual
reason behind a failure to demand cancellation appears to
stem from the costs which may arise.
Typical of the situation related above is a particu-
lar Comptroller General decision in which it is stated that
the "protestant was improperly denied the opportunity to
1-5
effectively compete for the procurement. . . . " Although
the protest was sustained, the Comptroller General further
stated, "practical considerations preclude our disturbing
14the award. ..." The protestant won the protest but
did not receive an opportunity to win the award.
Another approach taken by the Comptroller General
is to rule in favor of the protestant and make no comment
regarding the existing contract. In a protest to the
Senate, Select Committee on Small Business,
Selected Problems of Small Business
,
p. 10.
12Haycock, interview, May, 1969.





Comptroller General by Cause Manufacturing Company, against
Fab-Weld Corporation, the Comptroller General ruled in favor
of Cause Manufacturing; however, he failed to make any
reference to a possible termination of the existing con-
15tract. ' A situation of this nature gives the appearance of
an incomplete decision and results in the protestant's
winning a hollow victory.
Sustained Protest with Contract
Cancellation Demanded
Two situations may develop in this category. A
protest submitted by a second low bidder may result in his
receiving the subsequent reaward; however, many protests
are submitted by a third low bidder and the protestant in
that situation may not benefit from his protest.
A protest by Dayton Electronics Products against
a contract awarded to Tridea Electronics illustrates the
point. The Comptroller General sustained the protest and
demanded contract cancellation but noted in the decision
that the second low bidder and obvious candidate for award
was Otis Elevator Company, who should receive award ahead
of Dayton Electronics Products.
Another situation which may be placed in this
category is one in which a protest is sustained and contract
cancellation demanded, with a stipulation that a new
1
^Comptroller General Decision B-154079 (1964).
16Comptroller General Decision B-161722 (1968).
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invitation for bids be prepared. In cases of this nature
the protestant is required to enter the process under new
circumstances. The Comptroller General has indicated that
a sustained protest in which the contract is cancelled,
resulting from a defective invitation for bids, necessitates
17preparation of a new invitation prior to the re-award. '
Denied Protest
As indicated previously, the majority of protests
1 Pi
are denied. The impact of a denied protest on the pro-
testant may result in an ill feeling toward the Government
procurement system if the protestant strongly believes his
protest is valid. This aspect hinges on the motive of the
protestant in protest submission.
If the protestant submits his protest in anticipa-
tion of future favoritism by the contracting officer, as
19
suggested by L. R. Brown, a denied protest may satisfy him.
There is no evidence to indicate favoritism by the contract-
ing officer as a result of a denied protest; however, the
protestant may still believe a denial is actually a success.
If the protestant's intent, in submission, is to
influence procurement procedures, a denied protest may be
scored a victory by the protestant if some change allows
"^Comptroller General Decision B-142931 (1964).
1 o
Haycock, interview, May, 1969.
19^ Brown, interview, May, 1969.
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him to continue to submit bids using his own procedures,
which have previously been considered nonacceptable.
In a protest by Unitec Industries against Bendix
Field Engineering Corporation, Unitec submitted a late bid
modification which was considered unacceptable by the
contracting officer. The contracting officer did not
conduct negotiations with Unitec prior to award to Bendix.
The modification reduced the price to a level below that of
Bendix. Although the Comptroller General denied the
protest, he recommended a change to ASPR 3-805, relating
20to "Selection of Offerors for Negotiation and Award."
Depending on the protestant's intent he may have won even
though his protest was denied because he will, in future
transactions, be allowed to discuss similar late modifica-
tions with the contracting officer prior to award.
Impact on Contract Awardee
Protest decisions involving contracts awarded prior
to protest submission, or contracts awarded after protest
submission but prior to final determination, may have a
strong impact on the contract awardee. The awardee may,
for all practical purposes, be considered an innocent third
party in the protest triangle and yet his interests are in
jeopardy at inception of the protest. The impact on the
awardee may be considered directly in terms of cost to the
?0
Comptroller General Decision B-161782 (1967).
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awardee. Other points of impact include scheduling and
manpower requirements.
Cost Impact
The cost impact resulting from contract cancella-
tion is of primary importance; however, another cost impact
results from a stop work order issued after award but prior
to final protest decision.
Contract cancellation
Contract cancellation may result in the awardee '
s
receiving termination costs or in his receiving no reimburse-
ment under the contract.
Cancellation with reimbursement .—Prior to 1963,
contracts cancelled by the General Accounting Office, as a
result of bid protest decisions, were considered void with
21
no termination payment allowed. In 196$ the Court of
Claims established a precedent in the case of John Reiner
22
and Company vs. United States . A protest involving a
defective invitation for bids had been sustained and an
existing contract with John Reiner and Company had been
subsequently cancelled with no termination settlement.
Although the Comptroller General had ruled the contract
void, the Court claimed it was not in fact illegal since
21
Haycock, interview, May, 1969.




a responsible bid had been submitted in response to a defec-
tive invitation for bids, and the Court awarded John Reiner
and Company $17,000 termination costs. The Court indicated
the costs were those of a termination for convenience
23
settlement.
The major contribution of the John Reiner & Co . case
appears to be the establishment of a precedent which recog-
nizes that not all contracts cancelled as a result of a
sustained protest are illegal, and consequently null and
void, but may in fact be legal and require a termination
for convenience settlement vice no termination settlement.
Subsequent to the decision, the Comptroller General stated
that, relative to termination settlements, "credit will not
be allowed only when we are convinced that the agency has
awarded a contract under standards which a court would find
so incompatible with governing statutes and regulations as
24to render such contract a nullity. " The obvious indication
is that not all cancelled contracts are clearly illegal, but
may only be in violation of principle, and that an awardee,
unless the contract is clearly illegal, will receive
termination costs in the settlement of a cancelled contract.
Even obviously illegal contracts may provide
reimbursement to the contractor in certain situations. A
retention of benefits by the Government, in the form of
25 Ibid.
24Comptroller General Decision B-142931 (1964).

66
goods and services, warrants a liability of the Government
25
even in an illegal contract. y The retention of those
benefits makes the Government liable for payment of the goods
even though they were produced under an illegal contract.
Cancellation without reimbursement .—As noted
previously, the awardee of a contract which is not clearly
illegal may receive termination costs. Situations in which
the contract is illegal but in which the Government has
received benefits also result in certain reimbursements;
however, except for these situations the awardee suffers a
loss with no reimbursement.
The Comptroller General has charged that entering
into a contract in good faith is not enough and that
"contractors are charged with notice of all statutory and
regulatory limitations on the contracting officer's actual
authority and the Government is not estopped to assert such
limitations even where a private contractor has relied on
the contracting officer's apparent authority to his
detriment.
"
Basically, a private contractor who in good faith
enters into an obviously illegal contract with no resulting
benefit to the Government stands to receive no payment of
claims. This is exactly what resulted from a Triden
320 F. 2d. 367
26
-^Prestex, inc . v. United States, 162 Ct. CI. 620,
Comptroller General Decision B-161722 (1968).
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Electronics contract cancellation in which a stop work
order was issued ten days after award and no benefits
27
accrued to the Government. ' Triden, after working on the
contract for ten days, received no payment.
Another similar situation occurred when a contract-
ing officer exceeded his authority and entered into an
illegal contract with a bidder who was not the lowest
responsive, responsible bidder. The contract was ruled
illegal and no benefits had accrued to the Government.
The Comptroller General ruled the Government would "pay
po
nothing as termination settlement or otherwise."
Cost resulting from
a delayed decision
As discussed previously, a protest decision may
take a long period of time. A contract awardee may receive
a stop work order which will delay the contract performance
It is feasible to believe standby costs, in addition to an
increase in raw material prices due to inflationary trends,
may result in increased costs during the stop work order
period. A situation of this nature tends to invalidate
bid proposals relative to costs.
Impact on Scheduling
Scheduling problems logically arise in situations
in which a stop work order is issued pending final protest
27Ibid.
28Comptroller General Decision B-142931 (1964).
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determination and in situations in which an existing contract
is cancelled. A contract delayed due to a stop work order
results in a contractor's having a gap of indefinite duration
in his production line. As the contractor does not know the
point in time at which he may be allowed to proceed, he is
not free to schedule other work during the standby period.
In the event the contract is not cancelled, and the contractor
is ordered to continue production under the contract, his
entire production schedule may slip unless an acceleration
order is issued. The situation may result in an impact on
work other than that necessary under the protested contract.
Scheduling problems arising from a cancelled con-
tract are similar to those above. The contractor may find
himself in a situation in which he has scheduled work under
the contract and suddenly has no contract. If the contractor
has a backlog of work, the scheduling problem may be minor
since he can accelerate his other contracts; however, if no
backlog exists, the contractor may have no immediate work to
fill the void. The degree of the impact will necessarily be
in proportion to the size of the cancelled contract and
extent of work completion under the contract at the time of
cancellation.
Impact on Manpower Requirements
Delay of contract performance due to a stop work
order may reduce the required manpower level; however, as
the delay may be temporary, herein lies the conflict:
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whether to retain all personnel in a standby capacity or
to release a portion of the work force temporarily, pending
an order to continue work under the contract.
Probably the most serious impact results when
contract cancellation is demanded and the contractor has
no backlog of work to justify retention of the complete
work force. The result may be that the contractor will be
forced to release a portion of his work force until replace-
ment work can be acquired, at which time he will be forced
to make additional expenditures to restaff all vacant
positions. The degree of impact will necessarily be in pro-
portion to the size of the cancelled contract and extent






It has been demonstrated that there is a definite
need for an avenue by which unsuccessful bidders for
Government contracts can voice their objections to awards
or proposed awards. This particular necessity has resulted,
in part, from the actions of the Courts which have histor-
ically refused to hear and decide cases of the nature
described.
The situation has resulted in the development of
the bid protest concept in which an unsuccessful bidder may
submit a protest to the contracting officer or to higher
authorities when he believes established rules and regula-
tions have been violated. Procedures for handling the bid
protests have been developed by the Comptroller General and
the Department of Defense as well as others. The Comp-
troller General appears to have statutory and final authority
in determining bid protests while the Department of Defense
appears to have no specific statutory authority and no
final authority in the area.
In response to development of the concept, unsuc-
cessful bidders appear to have made increasing use of the




are not always in harmony with those intended by the
Government. Statistics indicate that a majority of all
bid protests submitted are invalid; however, it has been
demonstrated that the statistics do not necessarily provide
a complete view of the situation.
Most protests submitted, although varied in basis,
appear to fall into three major categories: protests
against responsiveness, protests against responsibility,
and protests resulting from ambiguity in the invitation for
bids, the requests for proposals and quotations, and the
specifications.
A very small portion of all bid protests appear to
be submitted to the Comptroller General, who has final
authority. Indications are that a vast majority of all bid
protests are submitted to, and determination is rendered by,
the contracting officer. Since the contracting officer's
authority is not final, and the protestant may carry the
protest to the Comptroller General level, it would appear
that, in most cases, either the contracting officer's
actions are satisfactory to the protestant or the protestant
does not desire to pursue the protest further because of
the fear of damaging good relations or the fear of becoming
the object of prejudicial influence in future contract
awards.
Procedures developed to process bid protests are
vague, especially in the area of post-award protests, in
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which almost no guidance is provided. The procedures relate
primarily to those necessary for handling protests submitted
to the Comptroller General. A minor conflict of authority
appears to exist between the Comptroller General and the
Department of Defense regarding cases involving pre-award
protests submitted to the Comptroller General. The fact
that the Department of Defense allows contracting officers
to decide on protests without consulting the Comptroller
General creates the conflict.
The applicable procedures provide no time frame
within which to process protests, but instead require long,
time consuming processes including submission of reports
through numerous levels of the chain of command. This
requirement results in processing time of as long as
eighty-four days for rendering determinations at the
Comptroller General level of authority.
Basic considerations for rendering bid protest
decisions appear to be twofold. The obvious consideration
is legality, based on applicable statutes and regulations;
however, a second, and apparently more dominant considera-
tion, is the interest of the Government. It has been
shown that in certain situations improper awards have been
sustained because it was not in the best interest of the
Government to terminate the contract. The best interest
of the Government normally relates to the time or money
involved. Since protest determination is a process
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conducted by the Government toward an action of the Govern-
ment, the concept of best interest of the Government is a
major factor in the determination.
Determinations of legality, on the other hand, are
often difficult to make, due to the lack of standards against
which to compare the award. This, it was noted, was
especially true in the area of negotiated procurements.
The lack of standards against which to compare
certain awards, in connection with the concept of the best
interest of the Government, promotes a degree of inconsistency
in protest decisions. It has been demonstrated that a
protest may provide a victory for the protestant if the
Government interest is not jeopardized, while a similar
protest may be denied under circumstances which are costly
to the Government in terms of time or money.
It has been demonstrated that protest decisions have
an impact on contract award. The rendering of a protest
decision, in pre-award protest cases, may result in delaying
the involved procurement or in altering the proposed
awardee. Pre-award protests may also result in the re-
advertisement of a given procurement. Post-award protests
may result in delaying the progress of work under the
contract, or in cancellation of the contract with or without
a termination settlement.
Protest decisions resulting from long delays in
determination, and the basic considerations of legality
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and best interest of the Government which determine the
decision, create a definite impact on involved Government
programs, on the protestant, and on the contract awardee,
in the event a contract has been awarded prior to the
rendering of the decision.
It has been the intent of this paper to explore
the preliminary actions and procedures leading to final
bid protest decisions and to evaluate certain decisions
rendered in an effort to determine their impact on the
involved parties. The major question to be answered
concerns a determination of whether or not the procedures
utilized in determining the protest ensure decisions that
are fair and reasonable in terms of impact on the involved
Government programs, the protestant, and the contract
awardee. Webster's New World Dictionary defines fairness
as the "treating of both or all sides alike without
reference to one's own feelings or interests," and
reasonableness as "amenable to reason; just."
Procedures for submission and determination of bid
protests provide no boundaries concerning what may be
protested. Virtually any unsuccessful bidder may protest
any action relative to the award, and this tends to produce
numerous invalid protests. Further, the procedures provide
a built-in delay mechanism for determining protests. This
delay is caused, in many cases, by the many levels of
command that must review, report on, and approve action on

75
protests that are submitted to levels of authority higher
than the contracting officer. The result of the numerous
invalid protests and the long time delay in reaching a final
protest decision is that a Government program may be
unnecessarily delayed. Delay caused by invalid protests
could certainly not be described by the definitions of "fair"
and "reasonable."
The same time delay, when a valid protest is
involved, can hold up a Government program for an unneces-
sarily long period. It has been noted that under certain
conditions a contract award can be made prior to protest
determination, but not all procurements meet these condi-
tions and as a result are delayed. It is these procurements
that are unnecessarily delayed by action which is neither
reasonable nor fair.
The cost impact of bid protests on Government
programs is of major concern. Protest procedures, which
cause the time delay discussed above, also permit post-
award protests, which may result in decisions that force
contract cancellation. These procedures allow contract
award prior to determination of a pre-award protest, and
this aspect is similar to post-award protests.
The costs involved in cancelling and reawarding
a contract can be staggering, and unnecessarily increase




It has been demonstrated that in only relatively
few protests does the protestant win the protest decision
and successfully force termination of an existing contract.
This hollow victory probably has a major impact on the
protestant.
It has been pointed out that protest decisions are
rendered by the Government and pertain to Government actions
It has further been pointed out that the best interest of
the Government is probably a more important aspect of a
protest decision than is legality. It was noted that the
procurement procedures state that actions relative to bid
protests are, in many cases, to be determined by whether or
not they are prejudicial to the Government.
Government interest in connection with the long
period of time necessary to render a protest decision
in many cases forces the awarding of a contract prior to
determination; in other cases protests are not submitted
until a contract award has been made. The result of these
actions provides a situation in which a protestant wins
the decision but cannot force contract cancellation because
of the time and money cost to the Government. This is
the hollow victory.
Since the definition of fairness refers to the
treating of both parties alike and disregarding one's own
interests, it would appear that the dominating Government
interest relative to protest decisions makes the concept
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grossly unfair. The term "reasonable" refers to being
"just," which has connotations of legality and impartiality.
These terms do not appear to fit well into a system in which
Government interest is free to triumph over legality.
The contract awardee involved in a bid protest may
normally be considered an innocent third party. The
development of the awardee ' s unfortunate situation is due,
in part, to the authority of the contracting agency to force
the contractor to commence work on a protested contract
prior to final determination. It is also due in part to
the fact that the contracting officer may issue a stop work
order if the existing contract contains a stop work clause.
The resultant impact is that a contractor may be faced with
a forced delay in contract performance or with cancellation
of the contract, with or without reimbursement.
The fact that the awardee may be forced to readjust
his production schedule for non-Government contracts and
may be forced to accept the risk of increased material and
labor costs due to a production delay on one Government
contract would give the appearance of an unfair and
unreasonable situation. During the period of protest
determination the contractor is in a state of suspension.
He may not be free to proceed under the contract; however,
at the same time he is not free to accept new work under
other contracts. This situation would appear to be unjust
and unreasonable since the contractor may have had no part
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in its development. He is, so to speak, a victim of
circumstances.
Probably the most serious impact on an awardee
results from a contract cancellation with no resulting
reimbursement to the contractor. It has been demonstrated
that even though a contractor enters into a contractual
agreement in good faith he is charged with knowledge of
the legality of the agreement. This situation, although
unfortunate to the contractor, appears to be reasonable in
intent. These situations appear to be extremely rare,
however.
A problem arises even when a contract is cancelled
and termination for convenience costs are paid to the
contractor. In such situations the contract is not
obviously illegal. It would appear that the noted incon-
sistency of protest decisions may have had some part in
the development of the situation. The contractor who
entered into the agreement may be faced with an idle plant
and be forced to operate at a level below full capacity.
The situation may develop even though the agreement is not
obviously illegal, or is illegal to the extent that the
contractor would be charged with a lack of knowledge.
This situation can truly be called one in which the con-
tractor's position as an innocent third party is jeopardized




In summary, it appears that unsuccessful bidders,
submitting protests to only the contracting officer level,
feel that the decisions are fair and reasonable or fear
future consequences resulting from protests carried to
higher authorities. This view is supported by the low pro-
portion of protests submitted to the higher levels, which
have final authority. Consideration of protests determined
by higher authorities reveals that, in many cases, the deci-
sions are not fair and reasonable in terms of the impact
on the involved parties. There is some indication that
this dissension may result from two major problem areas:
the longer time involved in processing protests submitted
to higher authorities and the dominance of the best interest
of the Government concept in protest determinations.
The results appear to promote a recommendation that
Government procedures be revised to provide assurance that
all involved parties will receive the most fair and reason-
able treatment possible.. Proposals relative to changing






As noted in the previous chapter, there is a
definite need for some improvement in the manner in which
bid protests are handled. It is the intent of this chapter
to set forth certain recommendations which may assist in
developing the bid protest concept into a meaningful
process.
1. Define the problem .—There is a need to define the
extent of the protest problem. Presently, no central
agency or board has coordination control of all protest
actions being conducted by the numerous decision rendering
agencies, and as a result the extent of the problem can
only be estimated.
It is recommended that a central coordinating
agency or board be established to receive monthly procure-
ment activity reports which set forth all protest actions
filed and the disposition or status of each protest.
2. Published summary of protest cases .—As noted in
the study, in many cases protests appear to be submitted
for invalid reasons or purposes. This procedure tends to




system,, thereby reducing the efficiency of the system. It
can be expected that a large portion of the invalid pro-
tests result from the protestant's lack of knowledge of
what is valid and what is not valid.
It is recommended that a summary of protest deci-
sions, indicating the bases of both the protest and the
decision, be published regularly and made available to all
Government contractors. It is further recommended that
the summary include invalid protests as well as valid
protests. The source of this information is expected to
be the report of monthly procurement activity discussed
above.
3. Reduce authority to proceed with award .—As noted
in the text, major protest injustices most often arise
when protest decisions are rendered subsequent to contract
award. It was further noted in the text that contracting
officers could, under certain conditions, proceed with
award prior to determination of a protest and the Comp-
troller General would not normally question the certificate
of urgency once it was issued.
It is recommended that the conditions under which
the contracting officer may proceed with award be tightened
to allow only the most necessary awards to be made.
4. Establishment of authority and policy .— It was
noted in the text that the contracting officer does not
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appear to have statutory authority to render protest deci-
sions and that the Comptroller General has interpreted his
statutory authority to settle and adjust claims as being
applicable to the situation. It becomes apparent that no
statutory authority directly pertaining to bid protests
has been established. This lack of statutory authority
precludes the development of a clear, authoritative policy
respecting protests.
It is recommended that Congressional action be
taken to establish a decision rendering activity with full
statutory authority, and that, simultaneously, a Congres-
sional policy regarding protests be developed and issued
in conjunction with the statutory authority. This action
will necessitate a determination, at Congressional level,
of what goals or objectives are desired from the protest
concept.
5. Declaration of remedies .—Remedies available to
the protestant who submits a valid protest appear to be
vague and not necessarily consistent.
It is recommended that the development of a
protest policy include a clear declaration of the exact





The recommendations discussed above may not
necessarily cure all ills of the system; however, their
development and implementation could be a sign of progress
in promoting a system which would be more fair and more
reasonable, in terms of impact on all concerned parties,
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